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NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN ACTION: A 
CASE STUDY OF ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Rob Laking 
ABSTRACT 
A case study of performance issues in the child protection services of New Zealand’s 
Department of Child Youth and Family (CYF) is used to discuss the effects of the New 
Zealand public management system on the allocation of public resources, 
accountability for performance and central steering of a decentralised management 
system. During the last six years, there have been three major reviews of the 
Department’s performance. Concerns with performance are rooted in growing public 
concern at the rate of family violence and child homicide in New Zealand. The case 
study concludes that control of child protection services by either outputs or outcomes 
is difficult and that CYF is likely to continue to experience ambiguity and political 
struggle over its objectives, the use of procedural rules for control rather than 
performance measurement and limited ability to learn from error because of the conflict 
over objectives. The general conclusion is that implementation of performance 
management systems works best where goals are clear and results can be observed, 
there are known effects of management intervention, and the management and staff of 
the organisation can learn from experience. 
 
INTRODUCTION – THREE QUESTIONS 
This article uses the case study of a perceived problem of performance in New 
Zealand’s Department of Child, Youth and Family Services (“CYF”) to raise three 
questions about our public management system. 
 
• Have the changes to New Zealand’s financial management system improved 
the allocation of public resources to public functions? 
• Is it possible to define and measure “performance” in the public sector in a 
way that supports public accountability? 
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THE NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:  
CREDITS AND DEBITS 
The coalition headed by the New Zealand Labour Party which became the government 
at the end of 1999 set out to stamp its own priorities on the public service it inherited. 
The public management reforms begun in the previous Labour administration of the late 
1980s had continued under coalitions led by the National Government. Most of the 
Ministers in the new government had played little part in the reforms of the Labour 
administration of 1984-90 and had plenty of opportunity to criticise them from the 
opposition benches in the following nine years.  
It is not surprising then that an early decision by the new government was to initiate a 
review of the New Zealand public management system. The  “Review of the Centre”, as 
it is known, reported in 2000 (Advisory Group, 2001). Perhaps more surprisingly it had 
quite a few good things to say about the system the new Ministers had inherited: 
1. Fiscal and public finance legislation set high standards for transparency of 
fiscal objectives and information about sources and uses of public money; 
2. There had been a great improvement in management of the government’s 
assets and liabilities and cash resources; 
3. Accountabilities and governance for public organisations were clearly 
defined and there was a strong focus on reporting and reviewing 
organisational performance; 
4. Greater flexibility for managers to innovate because of relaxation in 
central controls and focus on outputs produced rather than inputs 
consumed; 
5. Some evidence of increased efficiency and productivity in the public 
sector and a perceived rise in standards of client service ; 
6. A continued respect amongst public servants for democratic government, 
the rule of law and ethical public service. 
 
However the Review of the Centre and other commentators identified some significant 
issues or problems with the system: 
 
1. A feeling (longstanding) that the system of budgeting and planning was 
not helping Ministers make strategic decisions about policies and 
priorities; 
2. An excessive focus on a narrow contractual accountability for outputs and 
not enough on outcomes, the ultimate purposes of government; 
3. A sense that the apparatus of the state was fragmented and unable to deal 
effectively with problems that required a whole of government approach to 
planning and  implementation. 
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WHAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE?  
In the six years since Labour-led governments returned to office, some changes have 
been made: 
1. The basic framework for fiscal transparency and financial management 
remains largely unchanged but new provisions enable the broadening of 
appropriation heads to give Ministers more flexibility; 
2. The statutory basis for appropriation and for departmental accountability 
continues to be outputs, but the ex ante accountability document, now 
called the Statement of Intent (SoI), places a great deal more weight on 
information about outcomes; this has been supported by efforts to develop 
a programme logic that links government outputs, regulation and payments 
more clearly to outcomes; 
3. A number of policy decisions have been directed towards greater central 
coherence: 
a. Mergers of a number of single-purpose departments and agencies 
into larger Ministries; 
b. Strengthening Ministers’ role in setting performance expectations 
for agencies; 
c. Encouraging initiatives for policy and operational staff in different 
departments to work together on common problems; 
d. Promoting senior leadership development in the public service; 
e. Giving the State Services Commissioner a “leadership and 
guidance” role in the wider state sector. 
 
THE CASE STUDY 
THE POLICY PROBLEM 
In the last twenty years public concern at the rate of assaults against children has grown 
rapidly. High-profile cases of child homicides have been backed up by international 
statistics that show that amongst a group of 27 rich countries, New Zealand has the fifth 
highest estimated rate of child deaths due to maltreatment, although absolute numbers 
are low (UNICEF (Innocenti Research Centre), 2003). Assaults leading to serious injury 
are probably many times higher than those resulting in death. Most reported assaults are 
by parents or other family members.  
The increased sensitisation of the New Zealand public and official agencies to the 
problem of child assault is shown in a rapid rise in the number of notifications to the 
child protection agency of children at risk, since 2001. Reducing the number of assaults 
on children is generally acknowledged to be a responsibility for families and 
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Although several agencies have roles in child care and protection, the lead responsibility 
has always resided in the department administering New Zealand’s child welfare laws
1
. 
In the last 35 years, this responsibility has been with a Division of the Ministry of 
Education (up to 1972), a Department of Social Welfare (1972-94), a separate “business 
unit” of DSW (1994-99), a separate Department of Child, Youth and Family Services 
(CYF) (1999-2006), and from 1 July 2006 an operating division of a Ministry of Social 
Development (MSD).  
REVIEWS OF CYF  
During the short life of CYF as a separate department, the Labour government 
commissioned three major reviews of its operations and governance. 
The Brown Review in 2000 (Brown, 2000), led by a Judge of the Maori Land Court, 
made several recommendations on the management, accountability and funding of CYF 
and the hiring and training of social workers. The department responded with a “New  
Directions” strategy: a range of policy and management innovations. The government 
also agreed to significant increases in the department’s “baseline funding” (indicative 
three-year expenditure ceilings) to meet volume increases and hire and train new social 
workers.  
The Department however continued to struggle with ongoing budget problems and 
public criticism of the quality of its response to the rising rate of notifications. At the 
same time at the instigation of its Minister, it was expanding its role into “leadership” of 
community development and broad-based prevention activities. In 2002, CYF asked for 
further increases to its baseline to cope with the increased demand for its services. The 
government in response commissioned a second review, known as the “Baseline 
Review”. Although triggered by the additional funding request, this review had a broad 
brief to look at all aspects of CYF’s functions, organisation and funding. Officials from 
Treasury, the State Services Commission (SSC), MSD and CYF ran the review, 
reporting to their Ministers and a Cabinet Committee.  
The Baseline Review reported in September 2003, recommending a further large 
increase in CYF’s baseline, a significant narrowing of focus to its statutory care and 
protection and youth justice responsibilities, further investment in social worker 
capability and improvements in its management information systems. Shortly thereafter, 
the Chief Executive (CE) of CYF resigned. The SSC is responsible in New Zealand for 
recruitment and employment of departmental CEs. It began a search for a new CE 
towards the end of 2003. After an extensive international search, the government agreed 
to appoint a Canadian civil servant, who was then heading the Alberta child protection 
agency. The new CE took up her appointment in May 2004, but lasted only 18 months, 
resigning at the end of 2005 to return to Canada for personal reasons.  
                                                 
1 The current statute is the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, widely regarded 
internationally at the time of its enactment as an innovative approach to child protection and youth justice 
law. 
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At this point the SSC began the third review of CYF in five years. The SSC review was 
called a “machinery of government” review and also had a broad brief to examine the 
objectives and performance of the department (Minister of State Services (New 
Zealand), 2006). In fact, the review did not add much of substance to the detailed 
analysis in the Baseline Review; its main purpose was to was to recommend an 
alternative organisational form for CYF, which it did by proposing a merger of CYF 
into MSD. There is not a great deal of justification in the SSC’s report for this option – 
mainly that the department was likely to drift in the interregnum between the departure 
of the outgoing CE and the appointment of a new one. In any event, the government 
accepted this recommendation and CYF became an operating division of MSD in July 
2006. 
 
LESSONS FROM THESE EXPERIENCES 
BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
The Treasury’s main concern with CYF was its apparent inability either to forecast its 
financial requirements accurately or to allocate its budget efficiently, particularly 
between operations and capacity development. On the former point, there was the 
department’s repeated underestimation of the budget it would require simply to meet 
existing operational requirements. From 2000 to 2005 notifications rose by 77%, a huge 
acceleration in the rate compared with the previous five years. The department is on 
reasonable ground in arguing that it was difficult to anticipate this increase. On the latter 
point, the Treasury complained that money set aside for training and development of 
social workers was in fact being used to shore up operational responses. The 
department’s response was that this was a necessity – social workers could not be 
diverted for further training if they were urgently needed in the front line. 
To understand some of the issues around forecasting demand, it is helpful to have a 
simple model of the child protection system. The diamonds on the right hand side of the 
model indicate the main decision-points in the system. At each decision point an 
assessment needs to be made of whether the risk of the harm to the child warrants 
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Two basic problems with forecasting demand2 were  
1. child protection is an open system: demand for services is influenced by 
many factors outside CYF’s control; – part of the increase in the five years 
to 2005 may have been due to a rise in the underlying true incidence of 
child assaults, abuse or neglect but most of it was probably due to a 
change in reporting practices by notifiers; 
2. The incentives on and in the CYF part of the system are dynamic: they 
evolve in response to changing circumstances; some examples: 
a. There was a huge rise in notifications by the Police, who – at least in 
some districts – were starting to notify CYF routinely if there were 
children present at any domestic disturbance they attended;  
b. The shift to a central reporting system (a National Call Centre) reduced 
the informal “rationing” of responses (log as a otification, take further 
action) by local social workers; 
c. It seems likely also that – under the influence of intense scrutiny of 
public opinion – the intake social workers were tending to classify a 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to James Mansell, a senior researcer in Child Youth and Family, for allowing me to read 
an advance copy of his forthcoming article on the dynamics of the child protection system: Mansell, 
James (2006). "The underlying instability in statutory child protection: Understanding the system 
dynamics driving risk assurance levels". Social Policy Journal of New Zealand. 28 . 
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higher proportion of cases as requiring immediate action and 
investigation3; 
d. Under similar incentives – and perhaps because of other work pressures 
– there has been a steady growth in the average time children spend in 
the care of the department. 
A further problem has been forecasting the effects on costs of these different drivers: 
notifications, referrals for investigation and triggering the statutory processes under the 
Act. The Department has invested a lot in a business model for its budget processes but 
runs into basic information problems. CYF’s basic case management system wasn’t 
designed to provide information useful for a cost model; and social workers were 
generally reluctant to keep detailed records of how they allocated their time. Also 
questions of time recording tend to get caught up in the ongoing tension between 
workers and management (and indeed between corporate management and the 
Treasury) on setting of norms and standards for workloads.  
MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE - OUTPUTS AND PROCESSES 
Over the whole period 2000-06, performance in the care and protection output class for 
CYF has been measured by the number of notifications and the timeliness of the 
department’s response to them; the number of actions taken by the department (family 
conferences and other interventions) and the number of children in placements. Quality 
is measured by timeliness of response to notifications and referrals, graded by the 
department’s own assessment at intake of the degree of risk to the child, and backed up 
by an internal audit of the quality of practice decision-making.  
Timeliness of response is a major public issue. Public scrutiny tends to focus on the 
number of cases that are awaiting allocation to a social worker. Both opposition parties 
and government as well as the media watch this statistic closely and it is frequently the 
subject of debate. This is despite the fact that the department no longer formally reports 
the number externally – although it continues to use it as an internal performance 
indicator - and only supplies it outside in response to enquiries. For some years now, 
CYF’s preferred timeliness measure classifies referrals for further action into four 
categories of urgency and sets different standards of timeliness for each4. These 
standards are published in the SoI and reported against annually.  
 
 
                                                 
3 This is a problem of the counter-factual. From 2000-2005, notifications were going up, and referrals too, 
but not as fast. Would referrals have gone up more slowly if intake social workers at the Call Centre had 
maintained the same “threshold” over the period? Then, did the proportions distributed into the four 
“urgency” categories change over the period? James Mansell has pointed out that the dynamics here are 
likely to be quite complex: changes in behaviour at each stage - notifications, referrals, investigations, 
substantiation – are likely to lead to compensating changes at other points in the system. 
4 Though it should be added that, in all cases, a social worker is supposed to confirm straight away that 
the child is not in immediate danger. 
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Table: Timeliness standards for notifications 
referred as “further action required”5 






Critical 24 hours 95%-100 
Very Urgent 48 hours 90%-95% 
Urgent 7 days 50%-85% 
Low Urgent 28 days 50%-85% 
 
The language indicates one of the problems: it is politically impossible to describe any 
investigation as less than urgent although it is hard to see what urgency there is in an 
investigation that takes four weeks to complete. Arguably, though, this risk 
classification has less problems than “unallocated cases”. Fixation on simply reducing 
unallocated cases – without classifying them according to risk to the child – may divert 
social workers from higher priority tasks. Alternatively, the measure is clearly easier to 
“game” by simply adding to a social worker’s pile of cases and leaving them to decide 
when and how they will take action. 
The most obvious questions for a “purchaser” to ask about quality of social work 
outputs are (1) “did the logging, referral and substantiation decisions accurately reflect 
the risk to the child?”; and (2) “did the subsequent actions taken by CYF reduce the risk 
to the child to an acceptable level”? On the first question, the department lives in fear of 
“false negatives” – an incorrect assessment that the risk of harm was low. A high profile 
case of death or serious injury to a child where the department knew about the child is 
(probably rightly) much more emotionally and politically costly than a “false positive” 
– an unnecessary intervention into the lives of a child and his or her family. The result, 
probably, is the tendency to investigate and intervene more often to reduce the risk of 
false negatives, and accept the risk of a greater number of false positives. On the second 
question, the department is caught between a desire to ensure the continued safety of the 
child on the one hand and, on the other, the financial cost and threats to the welfare of 
the child that go with unnecessarily long periods in care. Again, the fear of false 
negatives may well be one reason for the gradual creep up in average periods in care – 
as well as the natural tendency of social workers to give their attention to more pressing 
problems than whether a child no longer needs to remain in care. 
                                                 
5 Source: Child Youth and Family (2006). "Statement of Intent". In Ministry of Social Development, 
Statement of Intent. Wellington: New Zealand Government. pp. 105-144. 
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The current performance reporting system is unlikely to provide timely information on 
the accuracy of the department’s diagnosis in either case. This is not the fault of the 
reporting system – it is just that neither question can be answered routinely within an 
annual reporting cycle. So how is social worker performance to be controlled on a day 
to day basis? The management response is not unexpected – a greater reliance on 
control over the processes that social workers are to follow in making decisions on 
intervention. A number of “tools” or “guidelines” have been introduced – checklists for 
social workers to follow when making their assessments of children at risk. Similar 
issues arise in other “triage” assessments – in hospitals or mental health for example – 
where there are strong incentives for clinical professionals to be able to say that they 
have followed prescribed procedures in deciding on a course of treatment. “Gold 
standard” practice tends to merge into “defensive practice”. Performance reporting and 
audit then tend to focus on checking for procedural regularity rather than results 
achieved. 
MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE - OUTCOMES 
Which leads on to a discussion of what child protection work is “for” – what are its 
outcomes? At one level, outcome statements are perhaps simply intended to be 
inspirational or to demonstrate that politicians have worthy ideals. The CYF SoI has its 
fair share of those: for example, under the heading of “Positive Outcomes for Young 
People”. Succinctly it is expressed as “healthy, confident kids”. More verbosely as: 
To enhance the wellbeing of children and young people, to enable them to reach 
their potential and contribute positively to society, Child, Youth and Family 
believes young New Zealanders need to be healthy, financially secure, safe, 
responsible, learn what they can; have a sense of identity and their basic needs 
met. (Child Youth and Family, 2006 p 14). 
This outcome is inspirational rather than operational. Goals have little significance 
unless they meet two criteria:  
1. They assist identification of tradeoffs: there is a real debate (political, 
managerial, professional) about the values expressed in the goals. 
2. They have operational content: it is possible to see the connection between 
what workers do and don’t do and progress towards the goal. 
An objective of the Baseline Review was to narrow the focus of CYF’s work back to its 
statutory role in child protection and youth justice. This involved making some 
judgements about the nature and effectiveness of social work. Traditionally, many 
social workers believe that “prevention” is an important part of their work – 
encapsulated in the old cliché that social work should help provide “a fence at the top of 
the cliff as well as (or rather than) an ambulance at the bottom”. The question they will 
ask is “how can I best contribute to a sustainable improvement in the quality of life of 
children and their families?”. Practice standards refer to “an appropriate and purposeful 
working relationship with clients”, acting “to secure the client’s participation” and 
helping clients “to gain control over [their] own circumstances” (Aotearoa New Zealand 
Association of Social Workers, 1997). Managers and policy analysts on the other hand 
tend to see the problem in cost-effectiveness terms, and politicians – not unnaturally – 
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in political terms. For an analyst, the question is “within a fixed budget, what operating 
practices are most likely to achieve the greatest reduction in risk of future harm to 
children”? To a manager the question is similar, but subtly different: “how am I going 
to direct the people in my group to best achieve the tasks set for me?”; for a Minister the 
question also relates to risk of a different kind: “how can I best achieve a public 
perception that I am responding effectively to public outcry about child assaults?”. 
The Baseline Review took an analytical approach. At a general level, the outcome could 
be expressed in terms consistent with the high-level outcome on page 78. But, the 
Baseline Review argued, within any realistic budget ceiling, longer-term work based on 
families and communities would have a lower payoff in terms of “healthy confident 
kids” than focusing on existing cases. Of course there are grades to this latter criterion: 
action taken by social workers to “help a family sort itself out” or “stabilise the child’s 
situation”, even when the current risk to the child is relatively low, may help reduce a 
greater future risk. Perhaps this comes down to an aspect of the triage debate – can 
“cases” be graded by probability of reducing the “disorder” vs cost of doing so? But the 
Baseline Review’s conclusion was that resources ought to go first to reducing the 
probability of “recurrence” – the reappearance of children in future notifications. This 
was expressed as follows: 
a. “To prevent the re-occurrence of child abuse, of neglect, and of insecurity of 
care, i.e. to keep safe children who have already been harmed. 
b. To prevent the first occurrence of abuse, neglect or insecurity of care. 
c. For children and young people who are CYF clients (both those in care and 
those who are not), additional outcomes are: 
1. To address the effects of harm. 
2. To restore or improve well-being (Baseline Review p 31)” 
This prioritisation found its way into the CYF SoI. ( Child Youth and Family, 2006, p 
120-1) as “preventing recurrence” with a “secondary role in working towards 
preventing the first occurrence”. The priorities of 2006-07 are reducing time in care and 
responding to demand. You could add to that the objectives of the “Responses to 
Demand External Review” directed by the Cabinet Committee on Government 
Expenditure. The “fundamental goal is to address sustainability of the Care and 
Protection system by stabilising and then reducing the notifications of abuse and 
neglect.” (Ibid. p 122). The focus is on “early intervention” – preventative services to 
forestall notifications but also better screening by both CYF and notifiers “to distinguish 
genuine [care and protection] concerns from those cases not involving a statutory 
intervention” (Ibid. p 123). 
At time of writing in late 2006, measures of these things had not appeared. CYF said 
only that it was “working towards” indicators and hoped to have them ready during 
2006-07. Records are kept of length of time in care and for re-notification of children 
previously on CYF’s books. But some basic problems will still remain: 
1. “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Core social work falls into 
a category of administrative interventions similar to police work in that 
success is measured by the absence of a symptom rather than presence of a 
benefit. The problems are also similar to those of the police: a lot of crime 
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goes unreported. There may similarly be many more children at risk or young 
offenders than come to the attention of CYF. Measures of “absence of 
substantiated recurrence” assume that all children and young people that are 
at risk are (a) detected; (b) notified; and (c) accurately assessed.  
2. Cause and effect. The department (or any indeed combination of state 
agencies) cannot be held accountable for preventing child abuse or youth 
offending when these pathologies are influenced by a wide range of measures 
beyond its control.  
MANAGEMENT DECENTRALISATION AND THE ROLE OF THE CENTRE - 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PERFORMANCE IN A DECENTRALISED SYSTEM  
Changes to New Zealand law on public finance and state sector employment in the late 
1980s fundamentally altered the relationship between accountabilities of the heads of 
government departments and the central control organisations. CEs gained control over 
the employment of staff and expenditure within budget authority. In turn, they became 
accountable to Ministers for the delivery of outputs and the efficient operation of their 
departments. They were paid somewhat better, but were also placed on term contracts, 
with only a limited right of renewal. There were two consequences of these changes. 
First, CEs’ employment risk measurably increased. Before the 1988 State Sector Act, it 
was practically impossible to get rid of the head of a government department before his
6
 
time was up. The evidence that this accountability is real and personal is in the hard 
cases when CEs either leave early or don’t have their contracts renewed. No CE has 
ever been formally fired, but several have clearly left their jobs because of 
dissatisfaction with their performance. Usually it is Ministers who are dissatisfied, and 
that is what in the end produces an early departure. In the CYF case the CE at the time 
of the Baseline Review resigned before the end of her contract, following widespread 
criticism of the department’s performance. The second CE seems to have left early for 
genuinely personal reasons. 
Second, for nearly 20 years now, the State Services Commission and the Treasury have 
had very little direct involvement in the management of government departments. 
Before the State Sector Act 1988, the SSC approved senior management appointments 
and organisational decisions, ran a central computing bureau and issued detailed 
instructions on matters of employment and pay. It also used to employ a very large 
inspectorate to adjudicate on matters of employment, organisation and systems in each 
government department. Apart from the Commissioner’s role in appointing and 
employing CEs, it has lost all these control functions. Similarly, the Treasury used to 
approve large items of expenditure within departmental budgets, run departmental 
accounting centrally, and issue regulations on departmental financial management. Both 
departments used to provide expert technical support on matters of organisation and 
methods or (in the Treasury’s case) accounting and finance.  
                                                 
6 “Permanent heads” were (nearly) always men.  
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Losing these control functions means that both Treasury and the SSC are formally 
mainly in an advisory role to Ministers on departmental management. Both are reluctant 
to get closely involved in implementation of management changes and are generally 
loyal to the idea that this is the CE’s responsibility. Ministers have shown some 
tendency to want them involved however. The Cabinet directed that four senior officials 
– from Treasury, SSC, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and MSD – 
should form an “Advisory Group” for the second CE at the time of her appointment. 
Suggestions by one of these officials that the group should be disbanded were rejected 
by the Ministers concerned. 
In other respects the present government is sceptical of the “narrow contractual 
accountability” of CEs to their Ministers as defined in the Public Finance Act. In 
particular, it has emphasized – even more than National-led governments in the 1990s – 
the need for CEs to work with each other on so-called “wicked” problems, those like 
crime or family violence where the outputs of several departments may contribute to an 
outcome. This was a major theme of the Review of the Centre. In other respects 
accountability is blurred by the role that Cabinet and senior Ministers play in 
determining priorities for departments, sometimes without the direct involvement of the 
responsible Minister. How does this affect the direct accountability of the CE to his or 
her Minister? The answer here is purely speculative, but it seems likely that while CEs 
will continue to retain direct formal authority over staff and budgets and to be employed 
on the term contract system, there will be a continuation of the trend towards more 
detailed policy directives from Cabinet and groups of Ministers and more micro-
management and rule-setting by individual Ministers responsible for departments. Thus 
while CEs will continue to face employment risk from non-performance, their 
autonomy over operational matters will become increasingly attenuated. 
MANAGEMENT DECENTRALISATION AND THE ROLE OF THE CENTRE - RE-
AGGREGATION AND CORPORATE PARENTING  
A basic dilemma in public management is whether to divide outputs into specialised 
organisations (e.g. executive agencies) to achieve focus and efficiency, or to combine 
them into multi-purpose Ministries to achieve synergies between related outputs and 
outcomes. Additionally, part of the doctrine of the public management reforms in New 
Zealand in the late 1980s and 1990s was to split off service delivery and regulatory 
functions into single purpose departments or agencies to avoid “policy capture”. The 
Labour-led coalition Government has to some extent reversed this trend, reabsorbing 
smaller single-purpose organisations into larger multi-purpose Ministries in Education, 
Health and Justice.  
The government had already taken action to re-absorb income support (together with 
employment placement, earlier taken over from the Department of Labour) from a 
separate Department of Work and Income (DWI) into the Ministry of Social 
Development. It seems likely that some Ministers had favoured doing the same with 
CYF for some time. The report prepared by the State Services Commission for its 
Minister largely rehearsed the problems identified in the Baseline Review. It canvassed 
four options for future organisation: the status quo; merger of MSD and CYF; dividing 
its care and protection and youth justice functions respectively into MSD and Ministry 
of Justice; and a new Ministry of Human Services. However the main part of the report 
focused on comparing a MSD-CYF merger with the status quo. It argued that if CYF 
  
International Public Management Review - electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 9 Issue 1  2008  © International Public Management Network 
88 
 
were retained in its present form a new CE with a clear mandate might be able to 
improve performance but that CYF “has had a history of not taking a system wide 
approach” and “it is a matter of judgement as to how realistic it is to anticipate a step 
change in performance over the short to medium term.” On the other hand, a merger – 
although some staff might “feel cynical about more change on top of an unfinished 
change programme” – would leverage off MSD’s “extant systems, processes and 
competencies” and “assumes minimal disruption to services” because CYF would – like 
Work and Income before it – essentially remain intact as an operating division of MSD, 
at least in terms of its operational management. 
On the whole, CYF does seem to have retained its operational identity, so far anyway. 
The “merger” was in fact a takeover by a senior of a junior entity, rather than a merger 
between equals. But the structure of the services side of the department remained 
unchanged: the three key managers - Operations, Service Development and Chief Social 
Worker - were all retained. A Strategy and Planning group headed by a former SSC 
official continued to provide policy advice and analysis specialised to CYF, rather than 
being absorbed into the larger MSD policy group. The main impact was on the 
corporate services staff – finance, human resources, IT – where some senior managers 
lost their jobs, or were appointed as “associates” to the corresponding MSD managers 
with reduced authority and staff. 
In both cases – DWI and CYF – the re-merger decision was partly due to the 
preferences of the key Labour Ministers for large multi-purpose Ministries as opposed 
to “fragmented” and “narrowly focused” single-purpose operational agencies. In both 
cases, also, the senior management of the departments were criticised for not paying 
enough attention to “managing Wellington” – maintaining and cultivating connections 
with their fellow CEs and the central agencies and ensuring that their political 
boundaries were secure. Thus the “corporate parenting” role for MSD – as well as 
spreading the overheads of corporate services such as finance, human resources and 
information technology – is certainly deemed to extend to covering this function of 
covering political and policy risk and – as for the Advisory Group for the second CE – 
help assure Ministers that operational decisions by CYF will not dump them into 
political problems. 
 
MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 
In the Cabinet Committee article on the future organisation of CYF, the Minister of 
State Services observed that 
The SSC’s stakeholder reviews have consistently found there is a 
culture of ‘resistance’ amongst some front-line CYF staff. In the SSC’s 
view this reflects ‘professional disregard’ for management. In the past, 
this may have been due to disconnected policy processes failing to gain 
the respect of social workers. This culture manifests itself by some 
social workers choosing not to follow prescribed process. Reviews into 
child tragedies have consistently found that failure to follow agreed 
process has been a key factor leading to the tragedy.  
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The judiciary is also concerned that youth justice plans are not given 
priority or are not implemented by social workers. In the SSC’s view 
this could be another example of the ‘resistance’ culture that puts 
priority on the views of the social worker over procedures, and in this 
case, legal systems and administration of justice. (Minister of State 
Services (New Zealand), 2006). 
Social work practice is in perpetual conflict between rules and discretion. Rules come 
from two sources: the requirements of the CYPF Act and administratively mandated 
procedures. But there are also large areas of case management where professional 
judgement is required, particularly in the initial assessment following a notification 
when intake social workers have to decide the immediate level of risk faced by the child 
or young person and in the subsequent indefinitely prolonged period of “case 
management” which may involve a range of interventions including placement and 
supervision. The rules for social workers can be designed either to give administrative 
effect to legal requirements – for example to respond to notifications, obtain court 
orders or hold family group conferences - or to mandate procedures which are deemed 
to be “best practice” – such as the department’s protocol for estimating risk to children 
of abuse or neglect in each case. Compliance with legal requirements is generally good; 
problems are more likely to arise when the department’s management seeks to enforce 
“best practice” requirements on front-line social work. A report contributing to the 
Baseline Review identified examples of variable uptake of rules-based assessment and 
task recording and commented that:  
Partly this uneven uptake may reflect front-line resistance or hostility to 
mandated corporate systems and a cultural antipathy to “management” 
as a role; or partly overwork and reluctance to become bogged down in 
“articlework”. (Social workers talk about being “slaves to the PC”). …. 
There is a tension for the department between the procedural (often 
encouraged by risk-averse politicians and managers) and the outcome-
based approaches to client interventions. The tension is exacerbated in 
periods of resource shortage …. ( Laking, Yeabsley, et al., 2003, p 107)  
A common social worker view on management is set out in Smith, 2004. Smith, a social 
worker in CYF for 17 years, attributes the incursion of “managerialism” on social work 
practice both in New Zealand and Britain to the “tentacles of globalisation and 
associated neo-liberal influence” (p 24). She says that the “business” model adopted by 
CYF is 
… driven by performance-based financial incentives to staff. The 
rewarding of staff in this way puts pressure on them to produce the 
required outcomes within the timeframes indicated. (p 22) 
Because CYF is dependent on a government budget that Smith regards as inadequate: 
The workers find themselves in impossible situations. In order to 
perform to their own level of integrity and practice standards, more of 
the social worker’s time and effort is required to bridge the gap and 
keep children and young people safe. This extra work goes unnoticed as 
the Department hides its failings and inadequacies behind the smoke 
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screen of fiscally driven key performance (achievement) indicators and 
performance measures. (p 22) 
As a result 
Social workers struggle to meet the measurable tasks due to inadequate 
indicators and lack of access to resources, and an inferior service is 
given to clients. … Unfortunately the inevitable happens and a child or 
a young person is placed in an inadequate placement. (p 22-23) 
Smith’s remedy is that 
Social workers have to be allowed to use their skills, knowledge and 
expertise alongside guidelines, and I emphasise the word ‘guide’, to 
assess outcomes in relations to their clients. … We need to stand up and 
say that statutory social work can work without the burden of a market 
model with outdated performance measures and defensive practice 
methods. (p 24) 
Smith’s polemic sharply delineates the problems of conflicting ideologies in social work 
departments. The complex relationship between rules and discretion in CYF also reflect 
ongoing differences between managers and professionals in public organisations. The 
conflicts between managerial and clinician values is well-documented in the health 
system. There is a conflict between managers making decisions to allocate limited 
financial resources on the one hand and clinicians’ advocacy for good patient outcomes 
on the other. At a governance level the conflict is between organisational and clinical 
governance. A Hospital Board is accountable to the government for quality of care on 
the one hand; and professionals are accountable to their own associations and 
disciplinary procedures on the other. The lines of these conflicts may be sharper in 
medical settings than in social work because of the long-standing existence of 
professional self-governance and statutory registration and supervision procedures in 
medicine which are only just starting to come into play in social work in New Zealand. 
(An Act for professional registration for social workers has only been in place since 
2003.) But they are remarkably similar in the basic conflicts they produce between 
central authority and the front line. 
 
GENERAL LESSONS 
At the core of the New Zealand model of performance management is the idea of a 
control loop between a superior authority or principal who sets tasks for a subordinate 
or agent. The conditions for “perfect control” are well understood, as are the 
implications when these conditions are not present. The elements of the analysis can be 
found for example in a classic article by Hofstede (Hofstede, 1981). Control of an 
activity requires that the objectives (outputs or outcomes) are unambiguous; the results 
are measurable; the effects of management intervention to correct deviations are known; 
and the activity is repetitive, so that both principals and agents can learn from the trial 
and error process of responding to deviations with corrections and observing the results. 
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Of these four conditions, maybe only the last is present in the CYF case. The 
implications for this are, drawing on Hofstede’s typology: 
1. Ambiguity about objectives for social work (the problem as constructed by 
Smith of social worker “practice standards” vs the “business model” 
inherent in the Baseline Review) is a political one and will only be 
resolved politically. But it doesn’t follow that the solution is hierarchical. 
Social workers have the position power of front-line professionals – as is 
evident in their continued refusal simply to comply with managerial 
requirements. The government can’t do without them, in the end. Child 
protection work will therefore continue to be a struggle between different 
sets of values as neither manager nor front-line worker can assert complete 
control. 
2. Neither what the government wants nor what social workers want is fully 
measurable, because of the problems of measurement of outcomes. 
Managers will therefore continue to assert the primacy of regulated 
administrative procedures and audit of performance of social workers on 
this basis; social workers the primacy of “professional judgement” in the 
circumstances of each individual case. 
3. Even if it were, the actions required to improve performance on measures 
such as “recurrence” or “minimum necessary intervention” are not fully 
understood. 
4. The solution then is literally complex. The basic strategy has to be 
organisational learning, but it is complicated by the ongoing conflict of 
objectives and the difficulty of learning from experience under these 
circumstance. 
Therefore one has to be pessimistic about the possibilities for significant improvements 
to the welfare of children resulting from state intervention. The implications for New 
Zealand’s public management model – either in its “narrowly contractual” form or the 
more ambiguity-tolerant form – are that its successful implementation still rests on the 
problem of reconciling hierarchical control with risk and ambiguity. 
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